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RECENT CASES
CONSPIRACY -

CRIMINAL

RESPONSIBILITY

-

OFFENSES

-

GUILTY PLEA OF ONE CONSPIRATOR AS AFFECTED BY ACQUITTAL

OF ALL OTHER CONSPIRATORS A and B were indicted for
conspiracy.1 B was tried and acquitted. A then pleaded
guilty and was sentenced. After serving a sentence for
another charge, A petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to
be released from serving the sentence for conspiracy. The
Arizona Supreme Court held, two justices dissenting, that
although A entered his guilty plea to conspiracy after his
alleged co-conspirator had been acquitted, acquittal of the
co-conspirator operated to deprive the court of jurisdiction to
render a judgment of conviction on A's guilty plea. Eyman v.
Deutsch, 373 P.2d 716 (Ariz. 1962).

The general rule is that one defendant in a prosecution for
conspiracy cannot be convicted where all of his alleged coconspirators have been acquitted or discharged under circumstances that amount to an acquittal.2

The basis of the rule

is said to be that the acquittal is a judicial finding of fact
Which is binding on the state and bars prosecution of one conspirator when there is no one with whom he could have conspired.3

There are several situations where the courts have found
that the circumstances did not amount to an acquittal. Thus
a defendant may be convicted where his co-conspirators are
unknown if the jury is convinced that there were other conspirators. 4 And where one co-conspirator has died, either
before or after the indictment, a single remaining conspirator
may be convicted 5 When the only co-conspirator testifies for
the state and is given immunity from prosecution for the of1. See Ariz.'ev. Stat. § 13-331 (1956); N.D. Cent. Code § 12-03-01 subsection 1 (1961).

1 2.

People v.

Tom, 13 N.C. 569

MacMullen, 134 Cal. App. 81, 24 P.2d 794 (1933); State v.
(1830); State v. McElroy, 71 R.1. 379, 46 A.2d 397 (1946);

accord, Reg. v. Ahearne, 6 Cox Crim. Cas. 6 (Ir.

Crim. App. 1852)

wherein

defendant was tried and convicted of conspiracy before his fellow con
spirators had been tried. The court, while recognizing the general rule, held
that the conviction was regular-and that to avoid execution defendant must

apply to the proper authorities for a respite until his fellow conspirators
had been tried. See generally 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 91 (12th ed. 1957).
3. Delaney v. State, 164 Tenn. 432, 51 S.W.2d 845 (1932).
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fense,6 or where the co-conspirator is alive and known but is
not tried for some other reason 7 the lone conspirator tried,
may be convicted. It has been held that a nolle prosequi as to
all but one conspirator does not prevent his conviction,8 but
there are decisions to the contrary.9
Where conspirators are tried separately, as in the instant
case, there is a split of authority on the question whether the
acquittal of one will require the acquittal of the other. The
weight of authority seems to follow the general rule and holds
that the fact the conspirators are tried separately is of no
consequence and an acquittal of all but one requires an acquittal of that one. 10 A few jurisdictions have reached the contrary result. Thus where one of two conspirators was convicted and the other acquitted in a later trial, the conviction
of the first was upheld." Where one conspirator pleaded
guilty and the other was subsequently acquitted after trial,
the court refused to release the first from custody.1 And the
dismissal of the indictment as to all remaining defendants did
not affect the conviction of one, who had previously pleaded
guilty.13 These holdings are based on the proposition that an
acquittal may result from a failure of proof, rather than the
non-existence of the conspiracy. 4 They contend that for
an acquittal of one to be an acquittal of the other, the conspirators must be tried with essentially identical evidence. 15
The decision of the court in the instant case seems to be an
unwarranted extension of the general rule. A plea of guilty
is not inconsistent with a verdict of acquittal. Acquittal results because the jury is not convinced of the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.1 6 It is submitted that the court
4. Donegan v. United States, 297 Fed. 641 (2d Cir. 1922).
5. State v. Aldridge, 206 N.C. 850, 175 S.E. 191 (1934).
6. People v. Cohn, 358 Ill. 326, 193 N.E. 150 (1934).
7. West v. United States, 161 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1947); Bryant v. United
states, 120 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1941).
8. United States v. Fox, 130 F.2d 56 (3rd Cir. 1942).
9. State v. Jackson, 7 S.C. 283, 24 Am. Rep. 476 (1876).
10. Sherman v. State, 113 Neb. 173, 202 N.W. 413 (1925), overruled by
Platt v. State, 143 Neb. 131, 8 N.W.2d 849 (1943); State v. Tom, 13 N.C. 569
(1830); Casper v. State, 47 Wis. 535, 2 N.W. 1117 (1879).
11. Platt v. State, supra note 10, See Jones v. Commonwealth, 31 Gratt.
836 (Va. 1878) where although both conspirators were tried in the same
trial, A made an out of court confession and B did not. The court held that
a new trial for B was not a basis for a new trial for A and by way of
dictum supported the rule of the above case.
State v. Oats, 32 N.J. Super. 435, 108 A.2d 641 (1954).
12.
13. State v. Lockhart, 241 Iowa 635, 39 N.W.2d 636 (1949).
14. Platt v. State, 143 Neb. 131, 8 N.W.2d 849 (1943).
15. See generally 27 Neb. L. Rev. 443 (1948).
16. This point of view is supported by Justice Struckmeyer, dissenting
in Eyman v. Deutsch, 373 P2d 716 (Ariz. 1962).
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in the instant case errored in blindly following the general rule
without investigating the reason behind it. Inconsistency is
the sole basis for the rule, because an inconsistent determination by the same jury necessarily reflects some defect in its
function. Here there was no determination by the jury as to
the defendant's guilt and thus there was no inconsistency.
PAUL M. BEEKS

EVIDENCE - COMPETENCY OF EXPERTS - EFFECT OF DIsCLAIMER BY THE WITNESS - The defendant was convicted of
indecently molesting a child; such conviction primarily based
on evidence given by an educated and experienced laboratory
technician. The trial court admitted her as an expert witness
and received her opinion that a slide prepared from a smear
taken from the child's body contained human sperm. The
technician stated that she felt the organism could have been
nothing else but human sperm, but she also stated that she
did not feel qualified to say whether it was human sperm or
not. The Supreme Court of South Dakota in reversing the
conviction held, two justices dissenting, that the admission
of such testimony constituted prejudicial error. The dissent
considered the evidence to be admissable and non-prejudicial;
its weight and value to be determined by the jury. State v.
Percy, 117 N.W.2d 99 (S.D. 1962).
A witness is established as expert and is qualified to give
an opinion when it is shown that he has special knowledge,
skill, experience, or training necessary to give an understanding answer to the subject of inquiry.' Without this special
knowledge of the particular subject matter, the purported
expert opinion would be a mere guess or conjecture. 2 It is
expected that such testimony will aid the trier in the search
for truth3 Neither special professional license 4 nor experience with identical circumstances 5 is required.
It is a general rule that the determination of a witness'
qualification and competency to speak is within the province
1. State v. Rtiff, 73 S.D. 467, 44 N.W.2d 126 (1950).
2. Gaddy v. Skelly Oil Co., 364 Mo. 143, 259 S.W.2d 844 (1953).
3. Woyak v. Konieske, 237 Minn. 213, 54 N.W.2d 649 (1952); State v.
Nelson, 103 N.H. 478, 175 A.2d 814 (1961).
4. Cordero v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 160, 297 S.W.2d 174 (1956).
5. Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953).

